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QUASI-RIGHTS FOR QUASI-RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS: A NEW FRAMEWORK RESOLVING 
THE RELIGIOUS-SECULAR DICHOTOMY AFTER 
BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY 
Krista M. Pikus* 
INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of corporate entities, courts must determine 
what constitutional rights and statutory protection these corporations 
should enjoy.  A major factor in the courts’ assessment is where on the 
religious-secular spectrum the corporation falls.  Although it has long been 
recognized that religious institutions can assert First Amendment free 
exercise rights, it is not necessarily clear that business corporations qualify 
as religious organizations warranting such privileges.1 
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court decided the controversial and 
highly politicized case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.2  The Court 
held that Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations 
imposing mandatory insurance coverage of contraceptives violated the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to closely held for-
profit corporations, because the mandate substantially burdened these 
corporations’ religious exercise.3  Many criticized this decision, largely on 
grounds that Hobby Lobby is not a “religious” organization.4 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.S., Business, Miami University, 
2012; B.A., Psychology, Miami University, 2012.  I would like to thank Professor Rick 
Garnett for his guidance and support in preparing this Comment, the staff of the Notre Dame 
Law Review for their excellent editing skills, and my family for their continuous love and 
support.  All errors are my own.    
 1  See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 6–16 
(2013). 
 2  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 3  Id. at 2775–79, 2785. 
 4  See, e.g., Noah Fitzgerel, Beyond Accommodation: Hobby Lobby as a Challenge to 
Our Perception of Religious Organizations, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2014, 5:59 AM), 
2014] Q U A S I - R I G H T S  F O R  Q U A S I - R E L I G I O U S  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  17 
 The Court’s analysis never officially declared Hobby Lobby religious 
or secular, yet it curiously described many of Hobby Lobby’s business 
characteristics as incorporating both religious and secular elements.5  The 
absence of a clear declaration whether Hobby Lobby is religious or secular 
is curious, because in earlier cases the Supreme Court often classified 
organizations as religious or secular before deciding if the organization had 
religious rights.6  More importantly, though, the Hobby Lobby decision 
failed to recognize a third option beyond the religious-secular dichotomy:  
a “quasi-religious” classification.  This classification would afford some, 
but not all, religious rights to organizations that embody religious 
characteristics while simultaneously maintaining secular aspects.  
Recognizing this middle-ground classification also suggests a useful 
amendment to the Affordable Care Act and similar statutes offering 
religious exemptions: granting quasi-rights to quasi-religious organizations 
in a way tailored to their particular corporate character.   
 This Comment aims to break free of the limiting religious-secular 
dichotomy by proposing a “quasi-religious” classification in order to 
achieve a more nuanced assignment of corporate religious exercise rights.  
Part I addresses the current legal standard for classifying organizations as 
religious and how the Hobby Lobby decision engaged that standard.  Part II 
identifies and discusses the problems with the religious-secular dichotomy.  
Lastly, Part III proposes a new solution to the problem of corporate 
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-fitzgerel/hobby-lobby-a-challenge-hobby-
lobby_b_5576513.html (“Americans do not universally consent to the majority opinion’s 
claim that Hobby Lobby constitutes a religious organization entitled to the same 
accommodations as religious communities like churches or religious non-profit 
organizations in the first place.  In other words, this is an issue even more fundamental than 
an argument about accommodation; instead, it is an argument about whether Hobby Lobby 
has even the right to approach the table as a religious organization.”). 
 5  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 6  See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (characterizing Conestoga as “secular” and using 
that characterization to justify the conclusion that it cannot engage in the exercise of 
religion), rev’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Barnes-
Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (following the stipulated 
facts, which identified Boy Scouts of America as a religious organization for purposes of 
resolving an Establishment Clause case); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 
F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (looking to for-profit status, among many other factors, in 
considering whether an organization is secular or religious for purposes of Title VII); 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 2004) 
(finding that Catholic Charities did not qualify as a religious employer for purposes of the 
statutory exemption); cf. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The 
Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to 
Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 757 n.69 (2005) (“It is difficult to 
understand how one can come to the conclusion that the Boy Scouts is a religious 
organization and that Catholic Charities or a Catholic hospital is not.”). 
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religious exercise rights that transcends the limitations of the religious-
secular dichotomy and may also bring clarity to the Hobby Lobby decision. 
I.     CURRENT LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASSIFYING ORGANIZATIONS AS 
“RELIGIOUS” 
The term “religious” appears in both constitutional and statutory 
frameworks and applies to organizations and individuals alike.  Yet, 
currently there is no established test for defining a religious organization.  
Courts sometimes rely on the criteria defining an organization as religious 
for purposes of Title VII when evaluating the religious nature of an 
organization in other statutory or constitutional contexts.7 
Two prominent cases—LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community 
Center Association8 and Spencer v. World Vision9—illuminate the several 
tests available for determining whether an organization is “religious” for 
purposes of Title VII.  In LeBoon, Linda LeBoon worked for the Lancaster 
Jewish Community Center, a nonprofit corporation whose “mission was to 
enhance and promote Jewish life, identity, and continuity.”10  The 
relationship between LeBoon and the executive director of the Center 
began deteriorating near the spring of 2002.  The Center fired LeBoon on 
August 30, 2002, citing financial difficulties and the ability for other 
coworkers to assume her responsibilities.11  LeBoon claimed the Center 
discriminated against her on the basis of her religion, because she was an 
Evangelical Christian.12  The Third Circuit held that the Lancaster Jewish 
Community Center was a religious organization exempt from compliance 
with the religious discrimination prohibition provision of Title VII.13  The 
court determined that, in analyzing whether a religious organization 
exemption applies under Title VII, “[a]ll significant religious and secular 
characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the [employer’s] 
purpose and character are primarily religious.”14  The Third Circuit 
 
 7  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1136 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the Hosanna-Tabor case for its effect on free exercise rights of corporations).  In 
determining whether an organization can be exempt for purposes of the Affordable Care 
Act, the Third Circuit in Conestoga Wood considered cases that dealt with religious 
exemptions for purposes of Title VII.  See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 401 n.16 (Jordan, 
J., dissenting) (citing Leboon, 503 F.3d at 229–30), rev’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 8  503 F.3d at 217. 
 9  633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 10  LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11  Id. at 221–22. 
 12  Id. at 220. 
 13  Id. at 231. 
 14  Id. at 226 (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th 
Cir. 1988)). 
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mentioned some factors typically relevant in determining whether an 
organization is “religious” for purposes of a Title VII exemption: 
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it 
produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of 
incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious 
purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with[,] or financially 
supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or 
synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious entity participates in 
the management, for instance by having representatives on the 
board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to the 
public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether the entity regularly 
includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities, (8) 
whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the 
extent it is an educational institution, and (9) whether its 
membership is made up by coreligionists.15 
The LeBoon court noted, however, that not all the factors may be relevant 
in every case.16  Rather, the factors should “be measured with reference to 
the particular religion.”17 
In Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.,18 the Ninth Circuit decided against 
using a checklist like the one in LeBoon, though disagreement remained on 
what standard should govern.  In World Vision, former employees brought 
suit against World Vision, Inc., a nonprofit faith-based humanitarian 
organization, alleging termination on account of their religious beliefs in 
violation of Title VII.19  At the time World Vision hired them, the 
employees “submitted required personal statements describing their 
‘relationship with Jesus Christ.’”20 Further, all the employees 
“acknowledged their ‘agreement and compliance’ with World Vision’s 
Statement of Faith, Core Values, and Mission Statement.”21  In 2006, 
World Vision discovered the “[e]mployees denied the deity of Jesus Christ 
and disavowed the doctrine of the Trinity,”22and fired them.23 
The Ninth Circuit agreed that World Vision qualified as a religious 
organization exempt from Title VII’s prohibition against religious 
discrimination, but the judges divided on their reasoning for reaching that 
 
 15  Id. (citing Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997)); EEOC v. 
Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993); Townley, 859 F.2d at 618–
19; EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 16  Id. at 227. 
 17  Id. 
 18  633 F.3d at 723. 
 19  Id. at 725. 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id.  
 22  Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 23  Id.  
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result.24  All three judges on the panel “agree[d] that a multifactor test does 
not work well because it is inherently too indeterminate and subjective.”25  
Judge O’Scannlain’s concurrence argued that “where the religious or 
nonreligious nature of a particular activity or purpose is in dispute,” the 
analysis should not rely exclusively on LeBoon’s “constitutionally 
questionable inquiries.”26  Rather, Judge O’Scannlain proposed an 
alternative evaluation based on a simpler, three factor test:  whether it is 
“(1) is organized for a self-identified religious purpose (as evidenced by 
Articles of Incorporation or similar foundational documents), (2) engaged 
in activity consistent with, and in furtherance of, those religious purposes, 
and (3) holds itself out to the public as religious.”27  In contrast, Judge 
Berzon stated that “Congress used the terms ‘religious corporation, 
association . . .  or society’ as they were commonly understood: to describe 
a church or other group organized for worship, religious study, or the 
dissemination of religious doctrine.”28  Consequently, only those 
organizations meeting this common understanding should qualify for the 
exemption.29  Judge Kleinfeld criticized Judge O’Scannlain’s test for being 
“too inclusive,”30 and Judge Berzon’s formulation for being “too 
exclusive.”31  Instead, he recommended a modification of Judge 
O’Scannlain’s three-factor test: an entity is “religious” if (1) “organized for 
a religious purpose,” (2) “engaged primarily in carrying out that religious 
purpose,” (3) “holds itself out to the public as an entity for carrying out that 
religious purpose,” and (4) “does not engage primarily or substantially in 
the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.”32 
Despite the several tests available for classifying an organization as 
“religious” at the time Burwell v. Hobby Lobby came before the Supreme 
Court, and the opportunity to settle debate among the circuits as to the 
correct formulation, the Court avoided the task of classifying Hobby Lobby 
along the religious-secular spectrum.33  The Court did, however, describe 
many religious aspects of the Hobby Lobby corporation.34  For instance, 
 
 24  Id. at 724 (per curiam); id. at 741 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  The opinion contains 
a per curiam decision, two concurrences, and one dissent.  Id. 
 25  Id. at 741 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 26  Id. at 734 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring). 
 27  Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 
(D.C. Cir. 2002); Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 399–400, 403 
(1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Breyer, J.)). 
 28  Id. at 753 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 29  Id.  
 30  Id. at 742 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 31  Id.  
 32  Id. at 748. 
 33  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–85 (2014). 
 34  Id. at 2766. 
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the Court noted Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose, which commits the 
owners to “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company 
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”35  The Court also noted 
that Hobby Lobby closes on Sundays in accordance with these principles, 
even though the company loses millions of dollars annually as a result.36  
Furthermore, Hobby Lobby refuses to engage in business transactions that 
promote the use of alcohol, because to do so would violate the 
corporation’s principles of faith.37  The fact that the Court took time to 
highlight the organization’s statement of purpose and practices in 
furtherance of that purpose likely signals that these are factors relevant to 
determining whether an entity is “religious”—but the Court neither set 
forth a definitive test nor officially characterized Hobby Lobby as 
“religious.”  Failure to complete this analysis38 leaves lower courts without 
a workable framework for assessing the religious claims of entities that are 
not closely held corporations.  Furthermore, in the absence of a clear 
classification of the corporation as a “religious” entity, many criticize the 
Court’s decision arguing that Hobby Lobby is not definitively a religious 
organization.39   
II.     RELIGIOUS-SECULAR DICHOTOMY 
Currently, no federal statute recognizes quasi-religious organizations 
for exemption purposes.  Although courts look at all the relevant secular 
and religious elements in characterizing an organization,40 the ultimate 
 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 2767–75. 
 39  See, e.g., Fitzgerel, supra note 4; Jamie Raskin, The Gospel of Citizens United: In 
Hobby Lobby, Corporations Pray for the Right to Deny Workers Contraception, PEOPLE FOR 
THE AMERICAN WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/gospel-citizens-
united-hobby-lobby-corporations-pray-right-deny-workers-co (“The astounding nature of 
the decision becomes clear when we focus on the fact that Hobby Lobby is a regular 
business corporation, secular in its operations and devoted to profit-making purposes.  It is 
neither a church nor a religious organization.”) (last visited Dec. 27, 2014); cf. Amelia 
Thomson-DeVeaux, The Spirit and the Law, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, 
http://prospect.org/article/little-known-force-behind-hobby-lobby-contraception-case (“It’s 
one thing to argue that a Catholic college’s daily operations are imbued with a religious 
ethos.  It’s another to contend that a corporation, competing in a secular marketplace, is so 
fundamentally guided by its owners’ faith that it should enjoy religious-liberty rights.”) (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
 40  See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“[A]ll significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine 
whether the [employer’s] purpose and character are primarily religious.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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judicial classification is secular or religious.41  Maintaining this religious-
secular dichotomy can be quite difficult when an organization embraces 
both religious and secular elements.42  The requirement that religious and 
secular characterizations be mutually exclusive may lead to contradictory 
outcomes.43  If this approach continues, then many organizations will likely 
face unfair treatment before the courts.   
The assumption that what is religious is distinct from what is secular 
is commonplace in our legal and cultural discourse.44  Nevertheless, this 
assumption is increasingly difficult to maintain in a world where the 
influence and involvement of religion often surfaces in the public sphere 
and political discourse.45  Some argue the religious-secular distinction has 
become blurred in American culture, thus rendering the religious-secular 
dichotomy no longer useful.46  The inept nature of the divide perhaps 
signals a need to revisit the way in which we classify organizations in a 
legal context.   
 Requiring the court to determine whether a corporation is religious or 
secular before ascertaining whether it is afforded constitutional rights or 
statutory protection may be a burdensome process that generates 
inconsistent results.  Some scholars even argue that the uncertain vitality of 
the religious-secular dichotomy warrants disregarding this portion of the 
analysis and instead allowing all corporations to assert free exercise 
rights.47 
There remains, however, an important distinction between 
constitutional religious rights and statutory protections.  The constitutional 
religious rights derive from the First Amendment, while statutory 
protections derive from Congress.  Statutory protections often provide 
enforcement mechanisms for preservation of constitutional rights, or 
additional safeguards to ensure or advance religious freedom.48  Even if all 
 
 41  Id.  
 42  For a discussion of the disparities and inconsistencies with states attempting to 
define religion, see Susan J. Stabile, supra note 6. 
 43  See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1072 
(9th Cir. 2012); LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 2004). 
 44  See Sheila Greeve Davaney, The Religious-Secular Divide: The U.S. Case, 76 SOC. 
RES. 1327, 1327 (2009). 
 45  Id. at 1327–28. 
 46  Id. at 1331 (“[W]e need to ask if our now more nuanced views of the secular and 
the religious have outlived their usefulness or whether they can be rehabilitated to provide 
significant work for the present.”). 
 47  See Colombo, supra note 1, at 16–24; accord id. at 1. 
 48  Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”), with Religious 
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corporations can assert First Amendment free exercise rights,49 it does not 
automatically follow that they should be granted every statutory 
protection.50  Although religious rights in the Constitution are distinct from 
religious protections afforded by statutes, courts have understandably 
viewed the interpretative question of corporate religious exercise as one 
uniformly answered.  For instance, in Conestoga Wood, the Third Circuit 
explained that its “conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot 
assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause necessitates the conclusion 
that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in the exercise of 
religion.  Since Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a 
RFRA claim.”51  While principles overlap in the constitutional and 
statutory contexts, it is important to keep in mind that what religion or free 
exercise means under the Constitution may differ from its meaning in a 
statute. 
III.     TRANSCENDING THE DICHOTOMY OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A.   The Need for and Benefit of a Quasi-Religious Framework 
Quasi-religious organizations bring benefit to society, and should 
enjoy constitutional and statutory protections commensurate with their 
religious nature.52  Certain organizations already make substantial 
 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(c) (2012)) (“Government shall not substantially 
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability.”). 
 49  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (failing to 
answer whether for-profit corporations may engage in religious exercise under the First 
Amendment). 
 50  See Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for 
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 114 (2013) (borrowing distinctions from Title 
VII or the Internal Revenue Code about differences in treatment for nonprofit or for-profit 
entities, if any distinction even exists, “is particularly problematic” in light of RFRA’s broad 
language). 
 51  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) rev’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 52  See CARL H. ESBECK ET AL., THE FREEDOM OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO 
STAFF ON A RELIGIOUS BASIS 92 (2004) (“It is not possible for a religious organization of a 
particular faith to retain the characteristics and tenets of that faith, if it is forbidden to take 
religion into account in its employment decisions.”); JAMES W. SKILLEN, RECHARGING THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 101 (1994) (“[T]he only way to assure a civic/legal unity that does 
not hang illegitimately on the coattails of an unjust ecclesiastical, ideological, or racial 
establishment is to make sure that every citizen enjoys full religious freedom in all spheres 
of life.”). 
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sacrifices in accordance with their religious beliefs.  For example, Hobby 
Lobby chooses to close its operation on Sundays, in an effort to honor the 
Sabbath.53  Failure to recognize the semi-religious nature of some 
organizations, and to reward them accordingly with constitutional and 
statutory protections, could cause the organizations to lose the ability or 
willingness to stay in business, thereby thwarting economic growth and 
limiting providers of important services.54  Furthermore, if such 
organizations shut down, the government may be forced to bear the 
economic burden of unsatisfied needs in the community,55 such as 
programs to assist the elderly, homeless, and orphaned.  
 “Quasi-rights” for quasi-religious organizations would mean that the 
quasi-religious organizations would not qualify for all rights or benefits 
that fully religious organizations enjoy, such as tax exemption56 or 
permission to hire on a religious basis.57  Rather, they would qualify for 
those rights that logically and meaningfully connect to the religious 
convictions of their organization.  Under the current religious-secular 
dichotomy, there is no ability to tailor the protections a “religious” 
organization receives, creating some concern that organizations may enjoy 
a range of benefits they do not deserve.58  A quasi-rights framework 
alleviates that concern by restricting religious protections to those logically 
and meaningfully connected to the corporation’s religious characteristics.   
A “logical and meaningful connection” test also encourages 
consistency between an organization’s words and actions.  Requiring a 
colorable connection between an organization’s religious mission and the 
exemption they wish to claim would encourage corporations to demonstrate 
through their business practices adherence to their mission statements.  
 
 53  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 54  See ESBECK ET AL, supra note 50, at 92; see also Matthew W. Clark, Note, The 
Gospel According to the State: An Analysis of Massachusetts Adoption Laws and the 
Closing of Catholic Charities Adoption Services, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 871, 894–97 
(2008) (discussing the closing of Catholic Charities in Massachusetts as a result of its 
adoption laws and arguing that, as a result, Massachusetts has lost its most successful 
adoption agencies).  For a discussion of the scope of religious liberty the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to embrace, see generally Kurt 
T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994). 
 55  See JAMES FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 744 
(Clark et al. eds., 17th ed. 2013) (“Congress encourages contributions to charitable 
organizations by providing taxpayers with this deduction.  This relieves some of the 
economic responsibilities that would otherwise fall on the federal government if not met by 
private funding.”). 
 56  See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 57  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 58  See Rienzi, supra note 50, at 112–13.  
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This would transform mission statements from mere “window dressing”59 
to guides of action.  In essence, this is a litmus test seeking demonstrated 
commitment to professed beliefs.  For instance, Hobby Lobby’s Sunday 
closing practice would provide evidence of the exercise of its religious 
mission.60  The validity of its religious practice is not the question 
presented; rather, at issue is whether the corporate practice conforms to the 
organization’s professed religious beliefs.61   
The concept of a “quasi-religious” organization is not entirely new; at 
least one court already employed this designation.  In Youle v. Edgar,62 the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the state requirement that a driver 
participate in Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of reinstatement of his 
driving privileges did not violate his constitutional rights, even though 
Alcoholics Anonymous could be considered a quasi-religious 
organization.63  The organization’s twelve-step program includes a belief 
and faith in God and has strong religious undertones.64 
In utilizing this framework, it is important to note that an organization 
denied religious status under one statute should not be foreclosed such 
status for other statutory or constitutional purposes.65  Courts often 
mistakenly treat the foreclosure of religious status under one statute as 
appropriate grounds for denial of religious status under a different statute.66  
The purpose of the “quasi-religious rights” framework is to allow the courts 
flexibility to recognize religious rights and protections where appropriate.  
When an organization is “quasi-religious” instead of fully religious, it will 
likely not qualify for all statutory religious exemptions.  For instance, if the 
Supreme Court classified Hobby Lobby as a quasi-religious organization, 
its sincere religious beliefs and business practices arising from those beliefs 
should be protected as religious exercises, even when the larger part of its 
 
 59  Donna T. Chen & Ann E. Mills, Addressing Ethical Commitments When 
Professionals Partner with Organizations, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 719, 722 (2008). 
 60  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 61  Id. at 1137 (recognizing Hobby Lobby’s “explicit Christian mission”). 
 62  526 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. App. 1988). 
 63  Id. at 899. 
 64  See Michael G. Honeymar, Jr., Note, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of 
Drunk Driving Probation: When Does It Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 437, 442 (1997). 
 65  See Rienzi, supra note 50, at 64 (“The better course is to protect religious exercise 
wherever it occurs regardless of identity, ownership structure, or tax status of the party 
engaged in the exercise.  In truth, this is the only course permitted under the Free Exercise 
Clause and federal religious freedom laws.”). 
 66  See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause necessitates the conclusion 
that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in the exercise of religion.”), rev’d sub 
nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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“secular” endeavors are subject to regulation.  Therefore, even though 
Hobby Lobby may assert a religious exemption for the contraception 
mandate, it will not necessarily be able to hire on a religious basis per Title 
VII, or enjoy tax exemption as a religious organization. 
B.   Nonprofit Status Should Not Be a Dispositive Factor in the  Quasi-
Religious Characterization 
An often-decisive factor in courts’ classification of an organization as 
religious or secular is whether the organization is a nonprofit entity.67  A 
policy that identifies profitmaking as incompatible with religion is a 
controversial value judgment that lies with Congress, not the courts.68  
Additionally, that policy ignores the ethical conflicts ever-present in 
business practice—“profit” is never obtained free of value judgments and 
temptations.  As white-collar crimes are on the rise,69 corporate 
commitments to ethical practices should be acknowledged as indispensable 
aspects of the business endeavor.  These corporate commitments to ethical 
practices will subsequently result in benefits to stockholders, as well as 
society in general.70  A corporation’s adherence to moral or ethical 
principles plays a role in the organization’s public reputation and goodwill, 
perhaps even affecting its status in the stock market.  For instance, the 
FTSE KLD Catholic Values 400 Index evaluates large corporations’ 
adherence to moral and ethical principles, presenting information to 
 
 67  See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 
2007) (looking to for-profit status among many other factors in considering whether an 
organization is religious for purposes of Title VII exemption).  In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, the court responded negatively to the government’s citation of Hosanna-Tabor 
as evidence that religious organizations must be nonprofit entities—the Tenth Circuit 
explained that “Hosanna-Tabor was not deciding for-profit corporations’ Free Exercise 
rights, and it does not follow that the Congress which enacted RFRA would have 
understood the First Amendment to contain such a bright-line rule.”  723 F.3d 1114, 1136 
(10th Cir. 2013). 
 68  Cf., e.g., Matthew 25:14–30 (describing, in the parable of the talents, a master 
becoming angry with a servant to whom money was entrusted after the servant did not 
invest the money while the master was away). 
 69  See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence 
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 865, 865 (2013) (arguing that the lack of prosecutions in the wake of recent 
financial scandals has created “perverse incentives” for “even more lawlessness”). 
 70  Cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Righteousness in Hobby Lobby’s Cause, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-garnett-obamacare-
contraception-surpreme-cou-20131205,0,2899.story#ixzz2mcEverlh (“At a time when we 
talk a lot about corporate responsibility and worry about the feeble influence of ethics and 
values on Wall Street decision-making, it would be strange if the law were to welcome 
sermonizing from Starbucks on the government shutdown but tell the Greens and Hobby 
Lobby to focus strictly on the bottom line.”). 
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Catholic investors who seek equity in corporations that align with the 
Church’s teachings.71  
A corporation’s for-profit status should not preclude it from enjoying 
rights of religious exercise.  Although courts often elevate nonprofit status, 
giving it vital consideration toward an organization’s religious standing for 
statutory religious exemptions72—that approach inexplicably makes tax 
exemption a stand-in for religious character.  It is an arbitrary boundary.73  
Although for-profit status may be a valuable element in considering 
whether an organization is religious, quasi-religious, or secular, it should 
not be dispositive.74 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment proposed that quasi-religious organizations should be 
recognized and afforded quasi-religious rights where there is a logical and 
meaningful connection to those rights, as demonstrated by the character of 
the organization.  Doing so would help to resolve the dichotomy between 
religious and secular corporations without unduly favoring religion or 
secularism.75  This framework is increasingly more necessary in American 
culture given the overlap of religious and secular aspects in many 
organizations.  The Hobby Lobby decision failed to officially classify the 
organization’s religious status, allowing confusion in this area of the law to 
fester.  Recognizing a middle ground of “quasi-religious” status could help 
to avoid or eliminate contradictory classifications, resulting in the 
safeguarding of genuine religious beliefs where appropriate. 
 
 
 71  See generally MSCI USA Catholic Values Index, MSCI RESEARCH (July 2010), 
http://www.msci.com/resources/products/indexes/thematic/esg/MSCI_USA_Catholic_Value
s_Index_Methodology_Jul10.pdf. 
 72  See supra Part I. 
 73  Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring) (“There is not much congruence between nonprofit status and the free exercise 
of religion. . . . Nonprofit status affects corporate governance, not eleemosynary 
activities.”). 
 74  See Rienzi, supra note 50, at 111 (arguing that making money does not preclude 
for-profit businesses from engaging in protected religious exercise). 
 75  See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 
(1994) (“Government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.”); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”). 
